In the broader picture, however, this change raises some concerns. It is extremely important for Georgia to present itself to the rest of the world as stable. Replacing one or two ministers is not prima facie evidence of instability, but when a government that has not yet marked its third anniversary in power is, for example, on its third foreign minister, third defense minister, second economics minister and fourth interior minister, it almost inevitably brings some governmental instability. In this environment, key ministries are often in a period of transition, and more significantly, members of government may become concerned that their jobs are in peril. This can lead them to focus more on the politics of remaining in office than the work of governance. It should also be noted that some ministries have been more stable than others. Justice Minister Thea Tsulukiani, and Energy Minister Kaha Kaladze, for example, have been in their positions since the Georgian Dream came to power in October of 2012.

The bigger challenge facing Tbilisi is that even a casual visitor cannot help but notice the poor air quality, dependence on automobiles, seemingly uncontrolled and unregulated construction, absence of pedestrian sidewalks, bike paths and the like. Again, these same conditions can be found in many cities, but generally in poorer countries. Georgia’s European aspirations are real and critical to the future and identity of the country. Its capital city, however, is lagging badly behind in this regard. European cities, with emphases on livability, neighborhoods, means of transportation other than the car, clean air and an environmental consciousness, seem distant from a Tbilisi that is still stuck in an earlier and less hospitable urban paradigm.

Nonetheless, the accusation that the current government is doing nothing is not entirely accurate. The government has signed an association agreement with the European Union, significantly decreased the likelihood of stumbling into war with Russia, implemented a popular health care reform program and expanded the democratic space in Georgia. These are important achievements, but they are frequently overshadowed by an economic climate that has left the government largely overmatched.

For Georgia, the US-Iran agreement may be a reminder that international relations are always susceptible to change and new developments. This may seem difficult to believe in Georgia, where renewed Russian aggression in the form of continuing to move the line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, is evidence of an unchanging Russian view towards Georgia. Georgia’s failure to stop Russia and the inability of the west to provide anything much more than strong words of condemnation also suggest that Georgia’s security challenges are stagnant in nature, but getting worse overall.

Framing Georgia’s future as a binary choice between the primal satisfaction of full integration into the west and succumbing to the shadowy influence of Moscow is an incomplete approach that leaves many Georgians caught between the unrealistic and the unthinkable. Therefore, thinking about other approaches, and indeed other outcomes, for Georgia is essential.

A civil society that can seemingly spontaneously bring thousands of people to participate in the less than glamorous tasks of shoveling mud and clearing the way for heavy equipment is also one that is less likely to see themselves as anything other than active participants, and in the vernacular of the donor community, stakeholders, in their country’s future. This is good news for democracy and for Georgia and something about which political leadership in that country should be aware.

If Poroschenko can get the best out of Saakashvili, this will have seemed like a brilliant move, international pressure on the current Georgian government to drop all charges against the former President will grow, and Saakashvili will indeed be in a better position to return to Georgian political life at some point. If, however, Saakashvili fails in Odessa, he will struggle to continue to be taken seriously by international actors outside of his political base in the Euro-Atlantic neoconservative right. The stakes, therefore, are very high for Georgia, Ukraine and Saakashvili himself, high enough that both Saakashvili and Ukraine would benefit from Saakashvili focusing, for the first time in more years than his new patrons might want to recognize, on governance, and spending less time kibitzing about the country he used to lead.

Western allies of Georgia also face a dilemma with regards to Tbilisi. In short, they can either bemoan growing Russian influence in Georgia or they can continue to delay and equivocate about Georgia’s movement towards NATO and the EU. They cannot, however, continue to do both. Western powers are undoubtedly aware that if the slow erosion of popular support for Georgia’s western ambitions continue in that country, then questions of NATO and EU membership will be moot within a few years. For those countries in Europe and NATO who have never been enthusiastic supporters of Georgia, this is perhaps ideal. It makes it possible to keep Georgia out of NATO and the EU without ever having to make fight over it. 

The messaging to the west behind the Khidasheli’s appointment cannot be ignored, but neither can the reality that the new defense minister has virtually no experience either running a government ministry or with many of the substantive responsibilities of her new ministry. Khidasheli’s management skills will be strenuously tested in her new position; and she will have to familiarize herself with a relatively new set of issues around defense. If she can do these things, she will succeed and make the Prime Minister look very smart. If not, her tenure at defense, like that of her two predecessors could be short.

Georgia is to some degree caught between the pull of further integration into European and western institutions, and the growing conflicts in the Middle East. While the former are appealing and symbolize the bright future to which Georgia aspires, the latter are a reminder of the turmoil and conflict into which Georgia could, through no fault of its own, fall. This is a reflection of the historical and geographical contexts that have always framed the geopolitical challenges faced by Georgia and, of course, strongly influenced Georgia’s political identity. European integration is thus a political goal but also a confirmation of how Georgia sees, or perhaps would like to see, itself. However, this confirmation cannot come at the expense of ignoring the other identities and proximities that have always had enormous impact on Georgia.

Assuring the security of the people is a primary responsibility of all governments, democratic or not. Accordingly, the rise in crime is, among other things, a failure of governance, but not necessarily a reflection of the democratic development of a particular polity. While for many citizens who may feel less safe, this may seem like an insignificant difference, for the government it is a very important one. Crime reduction, more than almost any policy area lends itself to deemphasizing democracy. It is much easier to reduce crime if the government is less concerned with democratic niceties like due process, the rights of the accused and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. However, if crime reduction comes at the cost of these democratic institutions, the longer term impact can be devastating. Georgians probably understand that principle better than most.

For Georgia, the larger question is one of crafting a multi-vectored foreign policy at a time when relations with the west are fine, but where further integration into the EU, and particularly NATO, is moving slowly. This has led some to probe the growing role, and influence, of Russia in Georgia, but Georgia’s foreign policy, and role in global politics should not be reduced to Russia or the west. This is not a question of where Georgia should turn if its aspirations to join western institutions fail, but more a question of what Georgia’s relationship with Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or China should be now, and once it becomes the southeastern most outpost of NATO or the EU. 

What has happened in recent weeks, not for the first time since 2013, is that the GD has been outmaneuvered politically. The President and Free Democrats have joined with the UNM to force the government into the position of essentially arguing that the economy, while not good, has not declined enough to warrant parliament discussing in an intense and focused way. This is, of course, a distinction without a difference. Moreover, it raises the politically disastrous question for the GD of just how bad the economy has to get before they will call it a crisis.

The former Georgian President, who has built his international reputation around being one of the most visible figures in the world seeking to draw attention to and limit Russias’ aggression, is undoubtedly aware of the stakes in Ukraine, and probably of the difficulty involved as well. In a recent opinion piece in the Washington Post, Saakashvili outlined his new role and the importance of reform in Ukraine, but also stressed the danger posed by Putin to the west and the need for the west to arm Ukraine. These opinion pieces can be helpful, and his analysis is largely consistent with most of the Washington foreign policy establishment. However, this piece also suggests that Saakashvili will use his new position to continue to draw media attention to himself and, as reported elsewhere, to lobby for the US to send weapons to the US. The question of sending weapons to Ukraine is the subject of much debate in Washington, with the White House reluctant than congress to send weapons, but the image of a very controversial Georgian politician, lobbying the US government to arm Ukraine is, to say the least, unusual.

For at least a decade, elections in Georgia have been seen through the prism of tests of democracy as foreigners seek to evaluate the state of Georgian democracy based almost solely on the one dimension of how fairly the election is conducted. That approach has proved decreasingly useful over time. The next election will, if democracy continues to evolve in Georgia, reveal not so much the state of election fairness of in Georgia, but the extent to which Georgia is genuinely becoming a multi-party democracy. Approaching the coming election in this context will lead to a better understanding of Georgia's political struggles.

Nonetheless, the principle that Georgia’s economic development lies in a sober understanding of its comparative strengths and weaknesses, rather than a cookie cutter approach, based on platitudes and uncritical analysis of the country, remains true. This understanding needs to lead to a vision and plan for development, without that Georgia’s economic future will be at the mercy of a grab bag of uncoordinated policies, hopes and largely meaningless statement of support by well meaning friends.

Saakashvili’s desire for attention, and the likelihood that he would like to return to power someday are clearly frustrating for the current Georgian government. These factors may have contributed to the decisions to charge the former leader with various criminal acts. Saakashvili knows how to get the current government’s dander up and almost certainly enjoys doing that. The GD government, for their part, has not yet figured out that the worst thing for Saakashvili is not prosecution, bad press or even the embarrassment associated with making outlandish and unprovable claims. For Saakashvili, being ignored is much worse than any of those things. Saakashvili makes himself very hard to ignore; and claims that Georgia is somehow allowing hundreds of citizens to fight alongside extremists in Syria cannot be ignored by the Georgian government.

2015, like every year in recent Georgian history, will be an important year for the country. Although there are no major elections, NATO summits or other such major events currently on the calendar for Georgia, the battery of foreign threats, economic stagnation and the struggle to build a strong and democratic state, that have defined Georgia’s almost quarter century of independence, will continue to be of central import to Georgia in the New Year.

Thus the biggest difference between how the two successive Georgian governments have addressed stubborn problems of governance is essentially that one did the politics better. The problem for the GD is that by not doing the politics well it is much easier for domestic and foreign critics to focus on the failures of governance. It is harder to draw attention away from, for example, persistent unemployment without the distraction of a shiny new bauble of a proposed brand new city in western Georgia. Similarly it is easier for the government to avoid scrutiny around personnel moves from the west if the western media and diplomatic classes are overwhelmed with a persistent stream of dubious but cheerful stories about the country’s democratic advance.

Success for any Georgian government is largely defined by handling the real problems and threats represented by Russia, but meaningfully moving the Georgian state and Georgian democracy forward requires addressing the need to change the space Russia occupies in the Georgian political psyche. This is extremely difficult because Russia is both a real threat and sometimes imagined bogeyman for Georgian politicians. Nonetheless, as long as the Russia that is the tool used to delegitimize political opponents, curry favor in the west or blame government failings upon still looms as a major factor in the minds of Georgian politicians, Georgia will be mired in many of the same problems that have plagued the country during at least last decade.