Sometimes the departure of three cabinet ministers is the sign of a dramatic political shift; and sometimes it is just politics. Many in the west initially reacted as if the events of November 4th and 5th were the former, but as the days go by is has begun to look more like the latter. If, in the next months, leaders of the Free Democrats confront legal harassment, the Georgian Dream coalition fractures more with the Republicans leaving and the President is pushed back to the sidelines of political life, there will be reason to think that the cabinet shakeup was a turning point, and for the worse, for Georgia. However, if these things do not happen and the Free Democrats are able to participate in political life, the President continues to play a bigger role and Ivanishvili’s role diminishes, then the fallout from November 4th and 5th will, on balance, have been positive for Georgia.

The events of November 4-5-the ouster of Defense Minister Irakli Alasania as well as the resignation of Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidize and Minister of Euro-Atlantic Affairs Alexander Petriashvili are the most significant events in the Georgian domestic political landscape since the election of 2012 that brought the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition to power. These changes to the Georgian government will have strong impacts on the internal workings of the governing coalition, the potential development of a genuine multi-party system, the perception of Georgia in the west and on Georgia’s efforts to move closer to NATO.

It would be good for Georgian politics, despite what many in the government may feel, for the UNM to contribute to a real multi-party democracy, particularly if the GD coalition begins to break apart. It is also probably true that the UNM is more likely to remain relevant, not by trying to become an omnibus ruling party again, but by consolidating its position as a western leaning, economic liberal party, reflecting the positions of many of its most dedicated supporters and filling a political niche that, public statements to the contrary, is not currently filled by the ruling GD block. Nonetheless, determining how to do that, and how to get there from here may be more difficult than it seems at first glance, but in the bigger picture it is the way forward for both the UNM and Georgia.

Georgia’s true strategic value to the west and elsewhere has not been in it being another country that is relatively small and definitively threatened by aggression from Moscow, as it has sought to position itself during much of the last decade, but as a country that is part of a broader geopolitical web of interests. Turning this strategic relevance into a meaningful step towards national security will be extremely difficult, but critical for Georgia.

Within the Georgian government, the clear winner of the spat between Garibashvili and Margvelashvili is Defense Minister Irakli Alasania. Ironically, Alasania was briefly drawn into presidential politics in early 2013 when he was stripped of the position of deputy Prime Minister by then Prime Minister Ivanishvili for floating his name as a possible presidential candidate for 2013. Today, Alasania is the most popular politician in Georgia, at least in part because he is not involved in domestic political fights. Additionally, many of Georgia’s allies are more comfortable working with Alasania than anybody else in the government.

Russia’s efforts to destabilize, annex and invade Ukraine over the last several months have, appropriately, been seen as the major development in the Eurasian region and have consumed a great deal of attention from policy makers, the media and, to a lesser extent, the public in the west. In that context, it is easy to understand how the ousting of the de facto president of Abkhazia followed a few months later by an election in which a hard-liner was elected to that office has gone relatively unnoticed in Washington, Brussels and other western capitals.

Mario Cuomo, the former governor of New York State and father of the state’s current governor, once noted that “You campaign in poetry. You govern in prose.” Cuomo was referring to the difference between campaigns based on vision, hope and imagery and the hard slog of real governance. A related observation might be that you campaign retrospectively, but you have to govern prospectively, meaning elections are often won by asking voters to reflect on the recent past, but governance must move the polity forward. This reflects the current environment facing the Georgian Dream (GD) government in Georgia, but this is not unique to Georgia. Similar dilemmas have confronted newly elected parties or coalitions who have unseated parties that been in power for a long time in many countries.

The question of what to do about Saakashvili had been a focus of the Georgian Dream (GD) government since it came to power in late 2012. Few in the GD government had any doubts that there was enough evidence agains Saakashvili to indict and even convict him, but most were aware of the complicated politics around charging the former President with criminal activities. 

The question for Georgia now is whether or not it is currently is a similar phase where more competitive elections, greater freedom than in the last years of the previous regime, and better elections are a residue of the moment where a yet to be consolidated undemocratic regime appears more democratic. Alternately, Georgia could be simply moving towards democracy. There are reasons to think that either of these scenarios could be true. The GD maintains control of virtually all aspects of government with most decisions and deliberation occurring internally, former government officials have been arrested and harassed, and the ruling block has held together despite internal differences. These are often signs of an ascendant one party dominant system. However, the GD has now been in power more than 18 months and despite occasional rhetorical missteps by its leadership seems comfortable with a vibrant opposition, has shown more restraint than many in the west would like to recognize in prosecuting former UNM government leaders, and has made little effort to crackdown on media and civic freedoms comparably to how the UNM did in its first six to twelve months in power.

Georgia’s two dilemmas are that they must continue to do what is necessary to get into NATO while at the same time preparing national security strategies that recognize that NATO membership may be a long way off. Similarly, on the domestic front, they must simultaneously begin to manage expectations in advance of the Wales summit while maintaining the pro-west consensus amongst the Georgian population. There is a lot at stake for Georgia here. If the pro-NATO, pro-West consensus deteriorates, or if Georgia is not able to continue to pursue the policies necessary to move towards NATO, Georgia’s chances of eventually joining the alliance will disappear altogether. However, focusing all their efforts on NATO will not meet Georgia’s security needs.