Local Elections in Georgia
The recently concluded Georgian local elections are evidence of just how stuck Georgian politics is. Like a bad sequel, a few new characters and minor plot lines were introduced, but the basic plot was the same as ever. As in almost every Georgian election since the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) came to power with a dramatic and unexpected victory in the 2012 elections, the biggest threat to the GD came from the party they defeated in 2012, the United National Movement (UNM); and as in every one of those elections, the Georgian people looked at both deeply flawed political forces and decided that, on balance, they were better off sticking with the GD. Despite their being out of power for almost a decade, the legacy of the violent semi-authoritarian late years of UNM rule has not been forgotten by the Georgian electorate. This contributed to the GD winning 46.7% of the popular vote while the UNM finished with a respectable 30.7%.
This year was supposed to be different, but so was every other recent Georgian election. As the election season began there was hope-this is not a new plot line either-that a third force would emerge. The difference was that the third force this time was For Georgia, a political party led by former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia. Gakharia has reputation for earnest competence, not least because of his stewardship of Georgia through the early day of the Covid-19 pandemic, which was a stark contrast with the current pandemic disaster that is Georgia. The former Prime Minister also was well-positioned to be an independent having been ousted by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the paramount leader of both the GD and the Georgian government, while having no ties to the previous UNM regime. For Georgia finished third overall with 7.8% of the popular vote, but underperformed relative to expectations. These local elections gave them a foundation on which to build, but not a lot more than that.
The much more interesting new plotline was that former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who remains the leader of the UNM and who was indicted in absentia by the Georgian authorities in 2014, returned to Georgia just as the voting began. Saakashvili has been promising to return for years, with these pledges peaking around elections. This year, Saakashvili honored that pledge, albeit in a strange way. After posting a photo of his plane ticket from Kyiv back to Georgia on social media. However, Saakashvili apparently eschewed his flight and returned to Georgia concealed in a truck.
On the morning of Election Day, Saturday October 2nd, rumors spread that Saakashvili was in Batumi, the Georgian resort town on the Black Sea. By the end of the day the former President had been arrested. Saakashvili knew his visit would end in arrest and believed his arrest would further undermine the legitimacy of the GD government. Unfortunately, for the former president, his return to Georgia and subsequent arrest has not yet become a major international issue. From a political perspective, Saakashvili’s return could be deemed a success. He succeeded in framing the election as another battle between the two titans of 21st century Georgian politics-Saakashvili and Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili won, but Saakashvili’s UNM finished a strong second and minimized Gakharia and any other possible third forces.
For Saakashvili, for whom attention is more important than victory or even oxygen, this was a victory. By returning to Georgia and making the election about himself, he pushed wavering votes that might have gone to third forces back to the Georgian Dream. That is not a huge problem for the UNM which needed to remain the top opposition force and was never going to win this election, but it also helped increase the GD margin. In doing that, Saakashvili ensured that Georgia would remain entrenched in a political battle that ultimately fails the Georgian people over and over.
This was a local election in which city councils and mayors throughout the country were elected, but it occurred in the shadow of last year’s parliamentary elections. Those elections, which like these ones, were deeply flawed and demonstrated the Georgian Dream’s faltering commitment to advancing democracy. Foreign observers, noted the faults but then indicated the results were essentially valid. Following the election, the opposition rejected the results, setting off a cycle of protest, arrests and boycotts that was labeled a “political crisis.” That crisis was essentially due to the GD’s unwillingness and inability to conduct good elections, but also to the UNM led opposition’s unwillingness to accept a resounding defeat that despite the problems of the election, generally reflected the will of the people.
That crisis was resolved with foreign intervention and a very strange agreement brokered by the European Union. The agreement, that if the GD did not get 43% or more in the coming local election there would be snap parliamentary elections, was absurd because it incentivized the GD to do whatever was necessary to get past 43% and incentivized the opposition to take to the streets again if the GD’s margin was a few points above that magic 43% number. Not surprisingly, several weeks before the election the GD withdrew from the deal.
The upshot of all of this is that Georgian democracy is stuck in neutral; more accurately it is stuck in a slow reverse. But, there is another loser in this election as well, the foreign powers, specifically the EU and the US who bought into the political crisis narrative several months ago and forced a strange deal onto the government and then did nothing when the government broke the deal. Moreover, despite their protestations and statements following the 2020 election there is no evidence thus far that the local elections were an improvement.
In other words, the west is losing influence in Georgia. The reason for this is simple, the Georgian Dream, perhaps intuitively, understands how little leverage the west has there. The US is not going to sanction Georgia or cut off assistance over a flawed election or a slow rollback of democracy. Similarly, the EU still wants Georgia to be a success and is not going to walk away from that project.
This lack of leverage is reinforced by the gradual erosion of western, particularly American, soft power in Georgia. The deep flaws in American democracy have made it much more difficult for American opinion on elections in other countries to get traction. The US is a country where supporters of a losing candidate violently storm the Capitol and continue to be supported by members of that candidate’s parties, where access to the vote is increasingly limited and where state legislatures empower themselves to overrule the popular vote in elections. No statement by the US Embassy, semi-governmental American organizations or multi-laterals that have strong American backing can be read outside of that context. The Georgian government understands that, while the American government is understandably confounded as to how to address this problem, but the result is declining American leverage and the continued erosion of Georgia’s democracy.