Within the Georgian government, the clear winner of the spat between Garibashvili and Margvelashvili is Defense Minister Irakli Alasania. Ironically, Alasania was briefly drawn into presidential politics in early 2013 when he was stripped of the position of deputy Prime Minister by then Prime Minister Ivanishvili for floating his name as a possible presidential candidate for 2013. Today, Alasania is the most popular politician in Georgia, at least in part because he is not involved in domestic political fights. Additionally, many of Georgia’s allies are more comfortable working with Alasania than anybody else in the government.

Russia’s efforts to destabilize, annex and invade Ukraine over the last several months have, appropriately, been seen as the major development in the Eurasian region and have consumed a great deal of attention from policy makers, the media and, to a lesser extent, the public in the west. In that context, it is easy to understand how the ousting of the de facto president of Abkhazia followed a few months later by an election in which a hard-liner was elected to that office has gone relatively unnoticed in Washington, Brussels and other western capitals.

Mario Cuomo, the former governor of New York State and father of the state’s current governor, once noted that “You campaign in poetry. You govern in prose.” Cuomo was referring to the difference between campaigns based on vision, hope and imagery and the hard slog of real governance. A related observation might be that you campaign retrospectively, but you have to govern prospectively, meaning elections are often won by asking voters to reflect on the recent past, but governance must move the polity forward. This reflects the current environment facing the Georgian Dream (GD) government in Georgia, but this is not unique to Georgia. Similar dilemmas have confronted newly elected parties or coalitions who have unseated parties that been in power for a long time in many countries.

The question of what to do about Saakashvili had been a focus of the Georgian Dream (GD) government since it came to power in late 2012. Few in the GD government had any doubts that there was enough evidence agains Saakashvili to indict and even convict him, but most were aware of the complicated politics around charging the former President with criminal activities. 

The question for Georgia now is whether or not it is currently is a similar phase where more competitive elections, greater freedom than in the last years of the previous regime, and better elections are a residue of the moment where a yet to be consolidated undemocratic regime appears more democratic. Alternately, Georgia could be simply moving towards democracy. There are reasons to think that either of these scenarios could be true. The GD maintains control of virtually all aspects of government with most decisions and deliberation occurring internally, former government officials have been arrested and harassed, and the ruling block has held together despite internal differences. These are often signs of an ascendant one party dominant system. However, the GD has now been in power more than 18 months and despite occasional rhetorical missteps by its leadership seems comfortable with a vibrant opposition, has shown more restraint than many in the west would like to recognize in prosecuting former UNM government leaders, and has made little effort to crackdown on media and civic freedoms comparably to how the UNM did in its first six to twelve months in power.

Georgia’s two dilemmas are that they must continue to do what is necessary to get into NATO while at the same time preparing national security strategies that recognize that NATO membership may be a long way off. Similarly, on the domestic front, they must simultaneously begin to manage expectations in advance of the Wales summit while maintaining the pro-west consensus amongst the Georgian population. There is a lot at stake for Georgia here. If the pro-NATO, pro-West consensus deteriorates, or if Georgia is not able to continue to pursue the policies necessary to move towards NATO, Georgia’s chances of eventually joining the alliance will disappear altogether. However, focusing all their efforts on NATO will not meet Georgia’s security needs.